The case against physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia: A jurisprudential consideration by TAN, Seow Hon
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
8-2017
The case against physician-assisted suicide and
voluntary active euthanasia: A jurisprudential
consideration
Seow Hon TAN
Singapore Management University, seowhontan@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence
Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
TAN, Seow Hon. The case against physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia: A jurisprudential consideration. (2017).
Singapore Academy of Law Journal. 29, 275-400. Research Collection School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2272
   
Published on e-First 4 August 2017 
 
THE CASE AGAINST PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE AND 
VOLUNTARY ACTIVE EUTHANASIA 
A Jurisprudential Consideration 
Twenty years after the Advance Medical Directive Act came 
into force in Singapore, the issue of the legalisation of 
physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia 
remains live. By examining jurisprudential arguments, this 
article makes a case against legalisation. In particular, it is 
important to address the points raised in the article by 
Toh Puay San and Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-
assisted Suicide in Singapore”, as it is possibly the most 
comprehensive local article on this subject and includes draft 
legislation for legalisation in Singapore. As Toh and Yeo also 
considered the arguments often raised in debates on 
euthanasia, it is apposite to approach the jurisprudential 
consideration by countering their arguments. In conclusion, 
the contention of Toh and Yeo that the benefits of allowing 
terminally-ill patients the option of physician-assisted suicide 
far outweigh the harms is not supported. A fortiori, voluntary 
active euthanasia should not be legalised. 
TAN Seow Hon* 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore),  
LLM (Harvard), SJD (Harvard); 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); 
Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
I. Introduction 
1 The Advance Medical Directive Act1 (“AMDA”) has been in 
force in Singapore for 20 years. The AMDA states that it does not 
“condone, authorise or approve abetment of suicide, mercy killing or 
euthanasia”.2 Abetment of suicide remains an offence under ss 305 and 
306 of the Penal Code,3 while attempted suicide is an offence under 
s 309. What is facilitated by the AMDA is an act that permits the dying 
                                                          
* I appreciate the helpful comments of an anonymous referee of this journal. 
1 Cap 4A, 1997 Rev Ed. 
2 Advance Medical Directive Act (Cap 4A, 1997 Rev Ed) (“AMDA”) s 17(2). 
A clarification is necessary as the act of withholding or withdrawing extraordinary 
life-sustaining medical treatments, covered under the AMDA, has sometimes been 
referred to as passive euthanasia. 
3 Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed. 
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process to take its natural course, as contrasted with an act that causes or 
accelerates death.4 The question whether physician-assisted suicide5 
(“PAS”) and voluntary active euthanasia6 (“VAE”) should be legalised in 
Singapore has been debated in the public square time and again. The 
central question of the debate is whether the law should facilitate an 
individual’s desire to end his life within a general context that 
“reverences human life”.7 
2 Amongst several articles dealing with this or related issues in 
Singapore’s context in the last two decades, “Decriminalising Physician-
assisted Suicide in Singapore” by Toh Puay San and Stanley Yeo8 stands 
out as they included draft legislation for regulating PAS in their 
advocacy for legalisation.9 Examining several arguments for and against 
                                                          
4 Advance Medical Directive Act (Cap 4A, 1997 Rev Ed) s 17(1). The distinction on 
principle is disputed by proponents of euthanasia. See, eg, Brett Kingsbury, “A Line 
Already Drawn: The Case for Voluntary Euthanasia after the Withdrawal of  
Life-sustaining Hydration and Nutrition” (2005) 38 Colum J L & Soc Probs 201 
at 230–231. Indeed, some argue that physicians are directly involved in the 
withdrawal of life support, but not so in the case of physician-assisted suicide: see 
Ken Levy, “Gonzales v Oregon and Physician-assisted Suicide: Ethical and Policy 
Issues” (2007) 42 Tulsa L Rev 699 at 728. 
5 In physician-assisted suicide (“PAS”), the patient administers the lethal dose; this 
may be through oral medication supplied by the physician or lethal injection, with 
the device and drugs set up by the physician and the patient pressing the final 
button. PAS is not possible in some cases, such as when the patient is wholly 
paralysed, in a persistent vegetative state or in a coma. In Switzerland, non-PAS is 
also permissible: see, eg, Roberto Andorno, “Nonphysician-assisted Suicide in 
Switzerland” (2013) 22 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 246. 
6 Voluntary active euthanasia (“VAE”) is distinguished from physician-assisted 
suicide in that the final act to cause death is done by a person other than the 
patient; this person may, for example, be the healthcare professional. VAE is 
contrasted with non-voluntary euthanasia, which is performed on a person who 
might never have had the capacity to request or consent, or failed to express his 
wish when he had the capacity, as well as involuntary euthanasia, which is carried 
out in the scenario when a patient does not want death or has expressed a wish to 
the effect, or when the patient’s wish is regarded as irrelevant and he is not asked. 
These definitional distinctions are generally recognised: see, eg, Wesley J Smith, 
“Does Human Life Have Intrinsic Value Merely Because It Is Human?” 
(2006) 13 Trinity L Rev 45 at 76. VAE is legal, for example, in the Netherlands and 
Belgium. 
7 Melvin I Urofsky, “Do Go Gentle into That Good Night: Thoughts on Death, 
Suicide, Morality and the Law” (2007) 59 Ark L Rev 819 at 829. 
8 Toh Puay San & Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-assisted Suicide in 
Singapore” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 379. 
9 As the decriminalisation of PAS does not involve a simple amendment to the Penal 
Code’s (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) prohibition of the abetment of suicide, but must be 
accompanied by new legislation – dealing with matters such as the categories of 
patients who may request for PAS, the qualifications of physicians who may 
perform the required acts, and what constitutes consent, this article will generally 
refer to what Toh Puay San and Stanley Yeo referred to as the decriminalisation of 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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the decriminalisation of PAS, Toh and Yeo contended that the benefits of 
allowing terminally-ill patients the option of PAS far outweigh the 
harms.10 Toh and Yeo suggested decriminalisation would: (a) be in line 
with the role of criminal law; (b) reflect the pre-eminence of autonomy 
in a secular pluralistic society; (c) achieve consistency in the law in view 
of the AMDA; and (d) take into account the importance of quality of life 
and other practical considerations. They rejected the argument against 
decriminalisation that relates to the sanctity of life as being “largely 
based on religious beliefs”,11 which in their view are conflicting and 
should not influence the decision as to the legalisation of PAS in view of 
Art 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore.12 They also 
rejected the view that legalisation presents a problem in medical ethics. 
Finally, they argued that slippery slope concerns “are largely 
speculative”13 and that safeguards can be put in place to protect patients 
from making requests that are not “truly informed and voluntary”.14 
3 When a question was asked in Singapore’s Parliament in 200815 
about whether euthanasia was being considered, the answer was in the 
negative.16 The question of legalisation of PAS and VAE, however, 
remains “live” in Singapore. The Chief Justice spoke on the topic for the 
Singapore Medical Association Lecture 2012.17 With advancement in 
medical technology allowing life to be extended, an aging population, as 
well as the legalisation of PAS and/or VAE in several other jurisdictions 
in the last few years, including the removal of the age restriction for 
euthanasia in Belgium in 2014,18 the question as to whether euthanasia 
in any form should be legalised in Singapore may again arise. This 
article will argue that PAS and VAE should not be legalised. Since Toh 
                                                                                                                               
PAS (in their title) as the legalisation of PAS, though the terms will be used 
interchangeably in this article. 
10 Toh Puay San & Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-assisted Suicide in 
Singapore” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 379 at 394. 
11 Toh Puay San & Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-assisted Suicide in 
Singapore” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 379 at 389. 
12 1999 Reprint. 
13 Toh Puay San & Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-assisted Suicide in 
Singapore” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 379 at 393. 
14 Toh Puay San & Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-assisted Suicide in 
Singapore” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 379 at 393. 
15 A search reveals that in that year, there were about 38 letters and articles in 
The Straits Times on the topic. 
16 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (17 November 2008), vol 85 
at col 711 (Question was raised by Mdm Halimah Yacob and answered by 
Mr Khaw Boon Wan, Minister for Health). 
17 Sundaresh Menon, Chief Justice of Singapore, “Euthanasia: A Matter of Life or 
Death?”, speech delivered at the Singapore Medical Association Lecture 2012 
(9 March 2013), published in SMA News (March 2013). 
18 “Belgium’s Parliament Votes Through Child Euthanasia” BBC News Europe 
(13 February 2014). 
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and Yeo considered the main arguments relating to legalisation of 
euthanasia, and since it is this author’s view, in particular, that their 
consideration of theory is inadequate and does not support their case for 
decriminalising PAS, their arguments will be used as a launchpad in this 
article for the consideration of jurisprudential debates. 
4 In Part II, the contest between autonomy and quality of life, on 
the one hand, and sanctity of life, on the other, will be examined. Three 
issues will be considered, the: (a) philosophical debate relating to giving 
effect to autonomy in a pluralist society; (b) extent to which individual 
choices about fundamental matters concerning one’s own life must be 
respected in view of the constitutional protection of religious liberty; 
and (c) difficulties relating to making a truly autonomous decision in 
such a context and what the implications are for the debate on 
legalisation. The first issue is the most important one in Part II, and 
indeed, is the one on which the rest of the debate pivots. This article 
will, however, not be making separate philosophical or ethical 
arguments for the sanctity of life, a topic which has been considered by 
many moral philosophers. Instead, the author’s aim is to highlight what 
exactly is at stake in the contest between autonomy/quality of life and 
sanctity of life as contradictory values which proponents on both sides 
of the debate argue should be foundational for legal frameworks. In 
Part III, as Toh and Yeo referred to the role of criminal law in advocating 
decriminalisation, this article will explain how their arguments relating 
to the role of criminal law are inadequate and contentious, and how 
continued criminalisation based on the sanctity of life is consistent with 
an alternative, albeit contested, view of the role of criminal law, which 
they have not properly considered. In Part IV, the subordinate 
considerations related to the medical profession’s likely involvement 
upon legalisation will be explored. These concerns are subordinate as 
the decisive arguments for the debate are those in the preceding Parts. 
Finally, the present article concludes that neither PAS nor VAE should 
be legalised. 
II. Pitting autonomy and quality of life against sanctity of life in 
a pluralist society 
5 The argument in favour of legalisation is based on autonomy 
and connected to the argument relating to the quality of life, as well as 
the denial of the sanctity of life. Toh and Yeo suggested that autonomy 
and individual freedom have priority in the absence of harm to others 
and in view of the pluralism of moral convictions, but at the same time 
© 2017 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
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rejected “death on demand”.19 Autonomy and mercy are seen as twin 
preconditions for allowing euthanasia, otherwise involuntary euthanasia 
could be permissible, or euthanasia could be offered to anyone, such as a 
lovesick teen, upon request.20 If the conditions of life are too bad, one 
should be allowed to seek release from misery, whether physical or 
psychic.21 Toh and Yeo regarded the value of sanctity of life as “largely 
based on religious beliefs”22 and not unanimously shared amongst the 
religious,23 and argued that laws should not be based on such a value. 
Quality of life is to be preferred as the determinant of when to permit 
PAS as it allows each person to die a dignified death. To deny the option 
of PAS would be “too inhumane, cruel and insulting”,24 particularly as 
some would end up attempting to die through other means, or 
physicians would help them die through administering pain-relieving 
drugs.25 
6 There are three major issues raised by the arguments relating to 
autonomy. The first is whether autonomy should have priority over the 
contending value of sanctity of life in view of the plurality of moral 
convictions. The second issue is legal: it concerns the view of Toh and 
Yeo that individuals should be permitted to pursue their “religious or 
philosophical beliefs and values”26 in end-of-life matters, in view of the 
                                                          
19 Toh Puay San & Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-assisted Suicide in 
Singapore” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 379 at 385–386. 
20 Margaret P Battin, “Physician-assisted Dying and the Slippery Slope: The 
Challenge of Empirical Evidence” (2008) 45 Williamette L Rev 91 at 95. 
21 Critics note that the argument related to the quality of life is based on human 
happiness and well-being, and question whether well-being might really be served 
by putting an end to life altogether: see, eg, Leonard J Weber, “Ethics and 
Euthanasia: Another View” (1973) 73 American Journal of Nursing 1228. The reply 
might be that the argument does not hinge on acts being permissible only if they 
are in service of well-being, but on life being only meaningful if minimum 
conditions of well-being can be attained. Critics also argue that there is no fate 
worse than death, or even if there is, based on the Kantian perspective, one should 
not treat one’s person as a means to avoid a medical fate which one perceives as 
worse than death: see Ben A Rich, “Medical Paternalism v Respect for Patient 
Autonomy” (2006) 10 Mich St U J Med & L 87 at 112–113; contrast Elvio 
Baccarini, “Rawls and the Question of Physician-assisted Suicide” (2001) 
I Croatian Journal of Philosophy 331 at 339–340. The specific philosophical debate 
relating to such metaphysical arguments will not be considered in this article. 
22 Toh Puay San & Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-assisted Suicide in 
Singapore” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 379 at 389. 
23 Toh Puay San & Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-assisted Suicide in 
Singapore” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 379 at 391. 
24 Toh Puay San & Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-assisted Suicide in 
Singapore” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 379 at 388–389. 
25 Toh Puay San & Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-assisted Suicide in 
Singapore” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 379 at 389. 
26 Toh Puay San & Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-assisted Suicide in 
Singapore” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 379 at 391. 
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constitutional guarantee of religious liberty. The third issue concerns the 
problems associated with the individual’s choice and whether it might be 
problematically autonomous, should autonomy be given primacy. Each 
issue will be explored in turn. 
A. Anti-perfectionistic liberalism and pre-eminence of 
autonomy27 
7 The argument founded on autonomy is crucial to proponents of 
legalisation. It seems at first blush attractive, especially if individual 
autonomy is pitted against the convictions of those who think PAS and 
VAE are wrong because they believe in the absolute value of the sanctity 
of life. As no one is forced to undergo PAS and VAE, why should others 
stop an individual who wants to die when he is not similarly morally 
convicted? 
8 John Rawls’s framework for the proper exercise of political 
power in a liberal society is arguably the best known of anti-perfectionist 
liberal theories that prioritise autonomy and refuse to ground laws in 
moral convictions as to what is good or what constitutes the good life. 
As Toh and Yeo claimed the pre-eminence of autonomy in a secular 
pluralistic society but offered little analysis, the application of Rawls’s 
theory to laws relating to euthanasia shall be considered so that we can 
determine whether permissive euthanasia laws are jurisprudentially 
sound. 
9 In Rawls’s view, the deployment of political power is “fully 
proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the 
essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be 
expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to 
their common human reason”.28 This would apply to the exercise of 
legislative power on basic questions of justice, such as whether to 
criminalise or legalise euthanasia. Rawls regarded as an advantage of his 
theory that his “political conception of justice”, while moral in nature, is 
not tied to any comprehensive doctrine, which Rawls defined as a 
philosophy that addresses what is of value in human life and ideals of 
personal virtue and character. The political conception of justice is 
affirmed by citizens on moral grounds based on their personal 
conceptions of the good or their comprehensive doctrines, but it does 
                                                          
27 For a good critique of anti-perfectionist liberalism, see Robert George, Making 
Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (Clarendon Press, Reprint 2002) 
ch 5. 
28 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993; paperback 
edition, 1996) at p 137. 
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not presuppose any particular comprehensive doctrine is adopted.29 In 
that sense, it is supposed to be neutral amongst the different conceptions 
of the good life, which are the subject of comprehensive doctrines. The 
political conception comprises political values, which can be used in 
support of particular laws. The political conception of justice is worked 
out for the limited object of structuring government, rather than 
regulating all of life. When terms of co-operation (including laws) are 
proposed by citizens, they must be proposed as the most reasonable for 
fair co-operation, and those proposing those terms (including laws) 
must think it at least reasonable for others as free and equal citizens to 
accept them. In so doing, citizens would be enacting laws in accordance 
with what Rawls termed “public reason”.30 
10 Rawls’s actual position in support of legalising PAS is found in 
“The Philosophers’ Brief ”, co-authored with other philosophers.31 To 
figure out Rawls’s reasoning for the legalisation of PAS, based on his 
theory relating to legitimate law-making, a leaf may be taken from the 
application of his theory in favour of permissive abortion laws. In 
relation to abortion laws, Rawls observed that those who strongly object 
to abortion, such as Catholics, but fail to win a majority, need not 
exercise the rights given by permissive laws but can, nonetheless, 
recognise those laws as legitimate. They should not impose their 
comprehensive doctrines on a majority of other citizens who, not 
unreasonably, do not accept those doctrines.32 Indeed, in his earlier 
work, Rawls stated his position on abortion more strongly, observing 
that any comprehensive doctrine that leads to a balance of political 
values that excludes a qualified right of mature adult women to end 
their pregnancy in the first trimester is unreasonable, and might even be 
cruel and oppressive, for example, when such right is denied except in 
the case of rape and incest. Voting from such a comprehensive doctrine 
goes against the ideal of public reason.33 Rawls considered three political 
values within a political conception of justice that might lead one to the 
                                                          
29 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993; paperback 
edition, 1996) at pp 146–148 and 174–176. 
30 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” 
(Harvard University Press, 1999) at pp 136–137 and 169. 
31 See Ronald Dworkin, Peter L Zimroth & Abe Krash, “The Philosopher’s Brief” 
(10 December 1996) <https://cyber.harvard.edu/bridge/Philosophy/philbrf.htm> 
(accessed 18 January 2017), submitted to the US Supreme Court in relation to the 
cases of Washington v Glucksberg 521 US 702 (1997) and Vacco v Quill 521 US 793 
(1997). It has been noted that John Rawls had not made many statements on the 
issue: see Elvio Baccarini, “Rawls and the Question of Physician-assisted Suicide” 
(2001) I Croatian Journal of Philosophy 331 at 332. 
32 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” 
(Harvard University Press, 1999) at p 170. 
33 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993; paperback 
edition, 1996) at pp 243–244. 
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conclusion that a woman should have a qualified right to abortion: due 
respect for human life; the ordered reproduction of society over time; 
and the equality of women as citizens. In his updated thesis on public 
reason, Rawls did not assess the comparative reasonableness of 
arguments cast in the form of public reason for or against permissive 
abortion laws, though he acknowledged the arguments for denying 
abortion rights on the ground of political values of “public peace, 
essential protections of human rights, and the commonly accepted 
standards of moral behavior in a community of law” qualify as such.34 
11 John Finnis objected to Rawls’s suggestion that Catholics need 
not exercise abortion rights as an answer to their opposition to 
permissive abortion laws. If permissive abortion laws were similar to the 
laws of South Carolina in 1859, which permitted but compelled no 
white men to own slaves, they would be unacceptable even if they were 
only permissive.35 Permissive slavery laws did not let each white man 
decide for himself whether to own slaves while leaving the question of 
the moral worth of slaves unresolved; in so far as permissive slavery laws 
did not accord the same property rights over white people, for example, 
it settled the metaphysical question of the moral worth of the races 
which could be enslaved – they were inferior and sub-human. Further, 
Finnis noted that Rawls did not explain why pregnant women, who 
would have been constrained by restrictive abortion laws, are not 
unreasonable in rejecting restrictions on their liberty, merely referring 
in a footnote to the view of Judith Jarvis Thomson,36 and claimed that 
many women who reject the idea that a foetus has a right to life from the 
moment of conception are not unreasonable in doing so. This is a bald 
assertion if no argumentation is made to demonstrate how the unborn is 
different from the newborn, such that it does not have rights which a 
newborn is regarded to have.37 Permissive abortion laws are founded on 
the metaphysical view that the unborn vis-à-vis the pregnant woman is 
of less worth than the newborn vis-à-vis the pregnant woman. In that 
sense, permissive abortion laws inevitably settle an intractable question 
that Rawls thought the idea of public reason, the political conception of 
justice, and the reference to political values allow legislators to skirt, 
making his theory attractive in a pluralist democracy where people have 
                                                          
34 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” 
(Harvard University Press, 1999) at pp 169–170. 
35 John Finnis, “Abortion, Natural Law and Public Reason” in Natural Law and 
Public Reason (Robert P George & Christopher Wolfe eds) (Georgetown 
University Press, 2000) at p 89. 
36 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993; paperback 
edition, 1996) at p liv. 
37 John Finnis, “Abortion, Natural Law and Public Reason” in Natural Law and 
Public Reason (Robert P George & Christopher Wolfe eds) (Georgetown 
University Press, 2000) at p 88. 
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different comprehensive doctrines and, therefore, different views on 
what is good or moral. 
12 These arguments and counter-arguments can be applied mutatis 
mutandis to PAS. Rawls is likely to prioritise autonomy and regard 
end-of-life decisions to be a fundamental matter concerning one’s life 
that is to be determined by each person’s conception of the good life or 
comprehensive doctrine where the categories of persons given the 
option of PAS are concerned. Due respect is accorded to life as not 
everyone is permitted to choose PAS. As laws should not be based on 
any particular conception of the good life but should be justified by a 
political conception of justice comprising political values, laws 
criminalising PAS can be seen as unreasonably restricting the liberty of 
patients who find their lives unbearable and wish to opt for PAS. 
Especially if sanctity of life, which connotes its inviolability, is seen as a 
moral value defensible only within particular comprehensive doctrines, 
laws criminalising PAS can be seen as founded on the sanctity of life 
and, therefore, being based on particular comprehensive doctrines.38 
Rawls might have countered opposition to the legalisation of PAS by 
suggesting that those who are opposed to PAS can simply not opt for 
PAS: the laws are permissive and not mandatory. Suppose, to view 
Rawls’s argument most charitably, we put aside slippery slope arguments 
relating to involuntary euthanasia which would colour the argument 
that such laws are truly permissive in effect. Suppose we also put aside 
such slippery slope arguments because they would count as public 
reasons or political values which could restrict such permissive laws 
under the Rawlsian framework. Even so, far from being based on 
political values alone and successfully skirting intractable questions, 
allowing PAS to particular categories of persons (such as those who are 
terminally ill), but not others, signifies that some lives are not worth 
living, and that the State does not have as much interest to protect them 
as it has to protect the lives of the healthy who are disallowed from 
opting for PAS,39 as PAS laws do not give all individuals unbridled 
autonomy. If the question whether life is indeed inviolable is a 
                                                          
38 In “The Philosophers’ Brief”, it was noted that “[d]enying the opportunity to 
terminally ill patients who are in agonizing pain or otherwise doomed to an 
existence they regard as intolerable could only be justified on the basis of a 
religious or ethical conviction about the value or meaning of life itself”: Ronald 
Dworkin, Peter L Zimroth & Abe Krash, “The Philosopher’s Brief”  
(10 December 1996) <https://cyber.harvard.edu/bridge/Philosophy/philbrf.htm> 
(accessed 18 January 2017) at Part I. It was also noted that death is “the final act of 
life’s drama, and we want that last act to reflect our own convictions, those we have 
tried to live by, not the convictions of others forced on us in our most vulnerable 
moment”: “The Philosopher’s Brief”, at Part I. 
39 While it may be that healthy individuals do not need assistance for suicide, it is 
conceivable that some would prefer to resort to physician-assisted suicide, which 
assures success in the outcome, than attempt suicide on their own. 
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metaphysical question to be settled by comprehensive doctrines or 
conceptions of the good, allowing PAS would in fact settle a 
metaphysical question – by suggesting that it is not inviolable, in those 
cases. The right to PAS is based on the denial of the sanctity of life for 
certain persons, rather than on letting each person choose whether they 
believe in the sanctity of life. 
13 Indeed, more generally, Rawls’s theory endorses a distinctive 
conceptualisation of the good, according to which personal autonomy is 
prioritised and each person is free to choose his own conception of the 
good life, restrictions being placed on autonomy only if they are 
supported by supposedly political values within the political conception 
of justice necessary to the basic structure of government. On its face, 
such anti-perfectionistic liberalism in relation to laws, known as the 
priority of the right over the good, does not overtly claim that objective 
moral values (such as the sanctity of life) do not exist, but only that it is 
agnostic to truth claims where the basic structure of government is 
concerned. It is neutral amongst different conceptions of the good life. 
A government can decide what rights (such as the right to PAS) a person 
has without basing those rights on ideas of what is good or settling 
questions of contentious morality. Such an approach to law-making, 
however, is rationally defensible if moral laws do not exist, or if moral 
laws and what is good are for each individual to determine, as it 
ultimately prioritises individual autonomy over other values such as the 
sanctity of life (or the good of life). In substance, this approach is in fact 
not agnostic as to truth claims, even as it purports to avoid grounding 
laws on truth claims (such as that relating to the moral value of sanctity 
of life as non-derogable) and seems at first blush neutral amongst 
competing philosophies by allowing each individual to make his own 
end-of-life decision according to his moral convictions. Restrictions are 
placed on those not in unbearable suffering, based on the political value 
that it is necessary to accord due respect to human life for the basic 
structure of government, which is different from an assertion as to the 
sanctity of life. As critics have noted, the philosophy that each individual 
is free to choose his conception of the good competes on the same 
normative plane as philosophies offering particular conceptions of the 
good.40 An example is Finnis’s theory of natural law. 
14 According to Finnis, there are goods of human flourishing 
common to all human beings, which should form the bases of legitimate 
laws. Finnis’s theory “grounds rights in goods”.41 Finnis suggested there 
                                                          
40 Patrick Neal, Liberalism and Its Discontents (New York University Press, 1999) 
at p 38. 
41 Robert George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (Clarendon 
Press, Reprint 2002) at p 145. George noted that the intelligibility of the right is 
rooted in the intelligibility of the good it protects. 
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are seven self-evident goods in the form of life, knowledge, friendship, 
aesthetic experience, play, religion, and practical reasonableness.42 
Individuals are free to prioritise subjectively the goods in their own 
lives,43 provided they respect a set of methodological requirements of 
practical reasonableness in the pursuit of the goods. Choosing the  
seven goods in a manner that respects the principles of practical 
reasonableness also means one is acting morally.44 Finnis specifically 
valued the authenticity of an individual’s choice when he endorsed the 
basic good of practical reasonableness, which involves bringing one’s 
intelligence to bear effectively on the problems of choosing one’s actions 
and lifestyle, with the qualification that practical reasonableness ranks 
alongside other equally fundamental basic goods in Finnis’s typology. 
Indeed, one of the principles of practical reasonableness is that one must 
not choose to do an act which of itself does nothing but simply or 
primarily damages or impedes the realisation of or participation in any 
one or more of the basic goods.45 Thus, practical reasonableness is not 
the equivalent of unbridled autonomy. Beyond the individual level, on a 
systemic level, legitimate law-making must put in place a set of 
conditions that enables the members of a community to realise their 
personal objectives and stipulates the ground rules they must follow, in 
line with the requirements of practical reasonableness.46 Thus, laws may 
legitimately be framed to prohibit acts which of themselves do nothing 
but simply or primarily damage or impede the realisation of or 
participation in any one or more of the basic goods.47 Since euthanasia is 
an act pursued with the intention of damaging the basic good of life, it 
may legitimately be prohibited. Only autonomy within reason would be 
supported by the law; the law should not permit acts which destroy the 
good of life as these are unreasonable exercises of autonomy which 
disrespect other equally fundamental goods such as life.48 In contrast to 
Rawlsian anti-perfectionism, the import of the theory is that a person 
has a right to euthanasia only if choosing euthanasia is moral (since the 
product of complying with the requirements of morality is moral 
action). One cannot decide what rights a person has without settling the 
                                                          
42 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 
2011) at pp 85–95. 
43 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 
2011) at pp 92–95. 
44 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 
2011) at pp 124 and 126. 
45 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 
2011) at pp 118–125. 
46 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 
2011) at pp 154–156. 
47 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 
2011) at pp 126–127, 154–156, 210–218 and 262. 
48 Robert George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (Clarendon 
Press, Reprint 2002) at pp 176–177. 
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question of whether the act in issue is good. The type of autonomy 
famously defined in Planned Parenthood v Casey by Anthony Kennedy J – 
“[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life” – 
is rejected.49 
15 Realising that Rawls’s theory, as an example of anti-perfectionist 
liberalism that supports the primacy of autonomy, is also based on a 
contested idea of the good means we should no longer readily prefer 
permissive laws on grounds of their neutrality amongst different 
conceptions of the good. 
B. Conflicting religious views, religious liberty and pluralism 
16 Relatedly, Toh and Yeo argued that, as there are opposing 
religious views about end-of-life decisions, the legalisation of PAS 
should not be influenced by religious considerations. Their argument is 
bolstered by invoking a constitutional liberty: allowing people to follow 
their own views in a pluralistic society, whether because they are not 
religious or do not act in accordance with their religion, “is endorsed by 
Art 15 of our Constitution granting freedom of religion”.50 
17 There are two interrelated but distinct points to be considered 
here: first, the extent to which religious arguments may be the basis of 
laws in a pluralistic society in which freedom of religion is 
constitutionally protected; second, the extent to which one may act 
upon one’s religious beliefs in one’s life choices in view of the 
constitutional protection of religious liberty. 
18 The reason for the exclusion of religious considerations by Toh 
and Yeo may be understood as follows: if arguments that are purely 
religious and rationally indefensible are accepted as the basis of laws, to 
the extent that only some of these arguments would be selected and 
conflicting views from other religions rejected, they would seem to 
result in laws which might possibly mandate or permit acts contrary to 
the practice or values of some religions. Toh and Yeo rejected the 
sanctity-of-life argument as a proper reason against legalisation (or for 
criminalisation) as they thought it is largely based on religion. This may 
be countered. First, some philosophers, such as Finnis, argue for the 
                                                          
49 Planned Parenthood v Casey 505 US 833 at 851 (1992). This is in fact noted in 
Ronald Dworkin, Peter L Zimroth & Abe Krash, “The Philosopher’s Brief” 
(10 December 1996) <https://cyber.harvard.edu/bridge/Philosophy/philbrf.htm> 
(accessed 18 January 2017) at Part II. 
50 Toh Puay San & Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-assisted Suicide in 
Singapore” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 379 at 391. 
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sanctity of life based on the self-evident fundamental good of life. Their 
arguments might be challenged, but Toh and Yeo should not have 
simplistically thought that such arguments are necessarily based on 
religion. Second, in so far as Toh and Yeo themselves argued for 
legalisation in limited cases, they arguably valued sanctity of life apart 
from those cases. But on what basis? 
19 Toh and Yeo further noted that religions offer different views on 
this issue, and concluded that people must be allowed to pursue their 
own end-of-life choices. This echoes the view of Stevens J in Cruzan v 
Missouri, when he noted that not much might be said confidently about 
death, unless it was said from the point of view of faith, and that alone 
was reason enough to protect the freedom to conform choices about 
death to individual conscience.51 Crucially, the right to profess and 
practise one’s religion and to propagate it, guaranteed by Art 15(1) of the 
Constitution, is generally not violated by a government not legalising 
PAS or VAE, in so far as one’s religion does not mandate suicide or 
euthanasia. Not offering the option of PAS or VAE does not lead one to 
act in violation of one’s religious tenets. If it is not argued that PAS or 
VAE is a requirement of one’s religion, there will be no need to embark 
on the analysis of whether the prohibition of attempted suicide and 
abetment of suicide relates to “public order, public health or morality” 
under Art 15(4). But even if one’s religion should mandate suicide, 
legislators may restrict one’s practice for the sake of public order, public 
health, or morality: for example, if the arguments considered in the next 
sections52 are persuasive, there may be reasons to restrict such practice. 
C. The reality of an autonomous choice 
20 Toh and Yeo rejected the view that autonomous, rational suicide 
is an oxymoron53 and addressed the concern that the vulnerable might 
be harmed in not having free and fully-informed consent through the 
imposition of safeguards such as psychiatric examination and requirement 
of witnesses.54 
21 It is questionable whether safeguards to ensure free and fully-
informed consent can guard against subtle pressures on sick individuals 
who are fearful of burdening family members and loved ones. Some 
                                                          
51 Cruzan v Missouri 497 US 261 at 343 (1990). 
52 See paras 29–39 or 40–44 below. 
53 Toh Puay San & Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-assisted Suicide in 
Singapore” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 379 at 393. Compare Susan R Martyn & Henry 
J Bourguignon, “Physician-assisted Suicide: The Lethal Flaws of the Ninth and 
Second Circuit Decisions” (1997) 85 Cal L Rev 371 at 393. 
54 Toh Puay San & Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-assisted Suicide in 
Singapore” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 379 at 393. 
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have suggested, by referring to empirical studies, that there is no 
heightened risk of abuse in the form of pressure on vulnerable groups,55 
while others have suggested that the availability of such options would 
have a coercive effect on women, who may have a tendency or are 
expected to be sacrificial,56 or minorities who for feelings of inferiority 
might not choose to continue their treatment as they feel that their 
existence is a burden to society.57 With euthanasia being available as an 
option, some would be lured by the cheaper price of euthanasia58 over 
prolonged and possibly ineffective treatment in the face of bleak 
prognoses, or end up having to justify their existence if they chose to 
continue with treatment.59 It has also been noted that the pressure to 
legalise VAE and PAS comes from educated, well-off, and politically 
vocal people who are non-religious and under 65, who are likely to have 
good health insurance, intact and supportive families, and the social 
skills and know-how to get what they want, while the harms of 
legalisation are likely to fall on the under-insured.60 
22 The objectivity of those tasked with assessing requests for 
euthanasia is also problematic. It has been argued that once one has 
accepted there are those who prefer to accelerate death when they 
suffer from particular conditions, “it [becomes] easier to presume an 
unspoken request from the next patient with a similar medical 
condition”.61 
                                                          
55 Margaret P Battin, “Physician-assisted Dying and the Slippery Slope: The 
Challenge of Empirical Evidence” (2008) 45 Williamette L Rev 91. A sad case is 
recounted in Wesley J Smith, “Does Human Life Have Intrinsic Value Merely 
Because It Is Human?” (2006) 13 Trinity L Rev 45 at 78. Kate Cheney was a cancer 
patient; there were conflicting opinions as to whether she understood her decision 
for euthanasia, given that she had Alzheimer’s. She had wanted suicide when her 
colostomy bag broke, but changed her mind when she was cleaned up; she was 
later sent to a nursing home for a week and, when she returned home, said she 
wanted to take pills; her daughter told her she was courageous and called her 
grandchildren for her to bid them farewell. 
56 Jennifer A Parks, “Why Gender Matters to the Euthanasia Debate: On Decisional 
Capacity and the Rejection of Women’s Death Requests” (2000) 30(1) Hastings 
Center Report 30; Katrina George, “A Woman’s Choice? The Gendered Risks of 
Voluntary Euthanasia and Physician-assisted Suicide” (2007) 15 Med L Rev 17 
at 18–22. 
57 David M Shelton, “Keeping End of Life Decisions Away from Courts after Thirty 
Years of Failure: Bioethical Mediation as an Alternative for Solving End of Life 
Disputes” (2008) 31 Hamline L Rev 103 at 125–126. 
58 Susan R Martyn & Henry J Bourguignon, “Physician-assisted Suicide: The Lethal 
Flaws of the Ninth and Second Circuit Decisions” (1997) 85 Cal L Rev 371 at 404. 
59 Susan R Martyn & Henry J Bourguignon, “Physician-assisted Suicide: The Lethal 
Flaws of the Ninth and Second Circuit Decisions” (1997) 85 Cal L Rev 371 at 408. 
60 Ezekiel J Emanuel, “What is the Great Benefit of Legalising Euthanasia or 
Physician-assisted Suicide?” (1999) 109 Ethics 629 at 641. 
61 Susan R Martyn & Henry J Bourguignon, “Physician-assisted Suicide: The Lethal 
Flaws of the Ninth and Second Circuit Decisions” (1997) 85 Cal L Rev 371 at 414–415. 
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23 Given these concerns, proponents of legalisation who accord 
primacy to autonomy must confront the possibility of abuse and 
derogation from autonomy. 
III. Role of criminal law 
A. Toh and Yeo’s view of role of criminal law 
24 More broadly, Toh and Yeo suggested the role of criminal law is 
to prevent “harmful or potentially harmful” behaviour.62 They 
elaborated on their idea of harm by referring to “harms which injure the 
interests and values that are considered fundamental to [society’s] 
proper functioning”63 [emphasis added], suggesting that they had in 
mind a broad conception of harm beyond physical harm to individuals 
or society. Despite the wide definition of harm, Toh and Yeo stated that 
PAS is “a harmless activity if the circumstances are such that death is 
seen as a benefit rather than a harm”64 [emphasis added]. They regarded 
the alleviation of “unbearable suffering” of the patient, the likelihood of 
the family’s consent and acceptance, and the removal of social burdens 
created by the patient as benefits, in contrast to possible losses suffered 
by the loved ones upon the patient’s death. The reference to “is seen as” 
in this context possibly refers to a weighing of benefits and losses, or to a 
subjective assessment of harm. 
25 The role of criminal law is highly controverted and the subject 
of the Hart–Devlin debate on the legal enforcement of morality more 
than half a century ago. Although Toh and Yeo made no reference to the 
debate, a brief digression to the classic debate – which shows the 
problems with various proposed justifications of criminal law – reveals 
that their definition of the role of criminal law, to support their case for 
decriminalisation, is problematic. 
26 In the debate over the Wolfenden Report,65 H L A Hart adopted, 
with two qualifications, John Stuart Mill’s view in his work On Liberty, 
according to which the coercive force of the law may only be used 
against an individual for the sake of preventing harm to others, but not 
                                                          
62 Toh Puay San & Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-assisted Suicide in 
Singapore” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 379 at 385. 
63 Toh Puay San & Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-assisted Suicide in 
Singapore” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 379 at 385. 
64 Toh Puay San & Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-assisted Suicide in 
Singapore” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 379 at 385. 
65 United Kingdom, Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and 
Prostitution (Cmnd 247, 1957) (Chairman: Sir John Frederick Wolfenden). 
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for his own physical or moral good.66 Hart’s two qualifications as to 
when the law may intervene outside of instances of harm to others are in 
relation to acts of public indecency67 and when laws are needed to 
protect actors from themselves in cases when decisions are made 
“without adequate reflection or appreciation of the consequences; or in 
pursuit of merely transitory desires; or in various predicaments when 
judgment is likely to be clouded; or under inner psychological 
compulsion; or under pressure by others of a kind too subtle to be 
susceptible of proof in a law court”.68 
27 In contrast, Lord Patrick Devlin was of the view that laws may 
protect the moral code of society, as society is a community of ideas and 
is held together by the bonds of common thought about good and evil. 
The morals of society are the morals of the reasonable person, and the 
law may step in to prohibit acts, even when he causes no physical harm 
to individuals and society, when the limits of tolerance are reached.69 
Devlin’s thesis has been criticised by those who object to the legal 
enforcement of morality as well as by those who support it. The thesis as 
to disintegration of society (in the breakdown of social order) when 
moral values change seems far-fetched, though Devlin might not have 
meant that;70 even those who support the legal enforcement of morality 
object to his moral non-cognitivism and his willingness to protect any 
society from his perceived threat of disintegration without regard to 
whether the moral code of the society in question is salutary or bad.71 
28 In view of the foregoing debate, Toh and Yeo’s case for 
decriminalisation is problematic. Their position on “harm” is 
unworkable. There is no clear delineation of, or any justification for, 
what is regarded as harm. While, at first blush, they appeared to 
subscribe to Mill’s harm principle, they were prepared to consider a very 
wide definition of harm and weigh certain types of losses suffered by 
those related to the person seeking PAS, such as the loss of 
companionship. Their position appears to be an amalgam of some of the 
foregoing positions, similar to Devlin’s in countenancing values 
fundamental to society’s functioning, but leaving these vague.72 In 
                                                          
66 John Stuart Mill: On Liberty and Other Essays (John Gray ed) (Oxford University 
Press, 1998) at p 14. 
67 H L A Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (Stanford University Press, 1963) at p 45. 
68 H L A Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (Stanford University Press, 1963) at p 33. 
69 Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford University Press, 1996) ch 1. 
70 Robert George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (Clarendon 
Press, Reprint 2002) at p 66. 
71 Robert George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (Clarendon 
Press, Reprint 2002) at p 71. 
72 Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford University Press, 1996) at p 6. 
While written in relation to England, the laws used to support the principle exist in 
Singapore. 
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weighing the interests at stake, Toh and Yeo seemed utilitarian. Aside 
from the problems plaguing utilitarianism in general,73 they 
contradicted themselves in concluding that PAS is “harmless” when they 
really must have meant that, in their subjective view, the benefits 
outweigh the cons, such as harm to others. But if so, they should have 
explained what value they attached to the various interests. As for Hart’s 
exception of paternalism that allows the law to step in to protect actors 
from themselves in cases when their judgment is likely to be clouded or 
consent not real, arguably, this has been considered by Toh and Yeo 
when they proposed legal safeguards to ensure that consent is informed 
and freely given. 
B. Alternative view of role of criminal law 
29 The positions advocated in the Hart–Devlin debate are 
problematic on numerous counts. Instead of addressing the problems at 
length, this article will instead argue for what is most relevant in relation 
to Toh and Yeo’s point about the role of criminal law. Two matters are 
pertinent: the importance of maintaining a moral ecology that promotes 
respect for life and the moral worth of individuals who are no longer 
useful to society; and the need for coherence in the fundamental 
principles which undergird existing laws. 
(1) Protecting the moral ecology 
30 As a modification of Devlin’s position, Robert George has 
persuasively defended the need to maintain a moral ecology 
inhospitable to vices through the use of law to uphold public morality as 
a common good of any community, whilst recognising the principle of 
subsidiarity in letting families, schools and religious institutions play 
their rightful roles as primary moral teachers.74 Such a defence of the 
moral ecology, unlike Devlin’s, is not indifferent to true virtue and the 
right morality, and also recognises the need for difficult prudential 
choices in light of the fact that the attempt to suppress some vices 
through law may result in greater evil.75 The question to be addressed is, 
thus, whether the sanctity of life and the moral worth of individuals 
(even those in the last stage of their lives) are fundamental principles 
which must be unequivocally affirmed so as to facilitate a moral ecology 
supportive of attitudes that respect lives and all individuals regardless  
of their utility to society. Toh and Yeo missed the point when they 
                                                          
73 These will have to be considered in some other forum. 
74 Robert George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (Clarendon 
Press, Reprint 2002) at pp 43–47. 
75 Robert George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (Clarendon 
Press, Reprint 2002) at p 44. 
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dismissed slippery slope arguments as “largely speculative” in view of 
their panacea of “strict regulations and safeguards”.76 The arguments 
they dismissed relate to changing social attitudes towards “death, illness, 
old age and the medical profession”, possibly leading to non-consensual 
euthanasia, and it becoming easier to kill those who are “comatose, 
retarded or suffering from crippling diseases”, finally degenerating to the 
killing of the “poor or socially undesirable”.77 There is a twofold rebuttal 
where the moral ecology arising from permissive PAS laws is concerned. 
31 First, the empirical slippery slope cannot be ignored when one 
looks at the facts across the world. In deciding on legalisation, the 
progression of euthanasia laws and attitudes towards euthanasia in other 
jurisdictions that have legalised it cannot be ignored. Even before going 
into such progression, as an aside, it ought to be mentioned that existing 
criteria for euthanasia are already problematic: for example, if 
euthanasia is permitted to those who are terminally ill, and if that is 
defined to include persons with less than 50% chance of living more 
than six months, this category might include the frail elderly in nursing 
homes.78 Beyond definitional issues, there remains a real possibility of 
the extension of euthanasia to infants, those with mental incapacities or 
disabilities, and the elderly, such that one cannot choose to deal with the 
issue of an empirical slippery slope only if these cases arise later.79 
Indeed, this has materialised to some degree, whether by a formal 
extension of categories of persons to whom euthanasia is allowed, or by 
loose application of criteria by personnel involved in the administration 
of euthanasia. For example, Belgium removed the age restriction for 
euthanasia in 2014; assisted death has extended beyond the line 
originally drawn by the law in the Netherlands to patients regarded as 
legally and medically incompetent and the possibility of extension to 
those who are not terminally ill but feel their lives are complete is being 
considered;80 severe psychic pain in an otherwise healthy person has 
been thought to be a sufficient ground for requesting euthanasia;81 and 
                                                          
76 Toh Puay San & Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-assisted Suicide in 
Singapore” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 379 at 393. 
77 Toh Puay San & Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-assisted Suicide in 
Singapore” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 379 at 393. 
78 Susan R Martyn & Henry J Bourguignon, “Physician-assisted Suicide: The Lethal 
Flaws of the Ninth and Second Circuit Decisions” (1997) 85 Cal L Rev 371 at 397–398. 
79 Ian Dowbiggen, “‘A Prey on Normal People’: C Killick Millard and the Euthanasia 
Movement in Great Britain, 1935–55” (2001) 36 Journal of Contemporary History 59 
at 84. 
80 “Netherlands May Extend Assisted Dying to Those Who Feel ‘Life Is Complete’” 
The Guardian (13 October 2016). 
81 Susan R Martyn & Henry J Bourguignon, “Physician-assisted Suicide: The Lethal 
Flaws of the Ninth and Second Circuit Decisions” (1997) 85 Cal L Rev 371 at 413–414; 
Wesley J Smith, “Does Human Life Have Intrinsic Value Merely Because It Is 
Human?” (2006) 13 Trinity L Rev 45 at 78. 
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researchers have found cases of non-voluntary euthanasia in the form of 
the termination of lives of disabled infants in the Netherlands.82 
32 Second, proper consideration must be given to attitudinal 
changes when euthanasia is legalised. Particularly, how will the moral 
ecology of society be affected? There are two main areas of concern: the 
weakening of respect for the sanctity of life, and how the attitude that 
treatment is not worthwhile is really a belief that particular patients are 
not worthwhile,83 thereby affecting the attitude to other similarly placed 
persons. However, advocates of euthanasia rebut that even if there 
would be a genuine weakening of respect for life, the old and suffering 
should still be allowed euthanasia; otherwise, they would be compelled 
to live and suffer for an “abstract social end”.84 Whether this rebuttal is 
tenable, ultimately, depends on the contention between the primacy of 
autonomy and the sanctity of life. 
(2) Protecting fundamental principles on which laws pivot 
33 One might also read Devlin more charitably to be concerned 
with protecting fundamental principles, on which a number of laws are 
based, which are derogated from when a particular act is decriminalised, 
and which, therefore, might no longer support those other laws. 
Arguably, the decriminalisation of euthanasia hinges on the rejection of 
particular principles which undergird other laws, and the rejection, 
ultimately, has an effect on the tenability of those other laws in the long 
run. Two main principles are at stake. 
34 The first has been noted in Part II:85 the primacy of autonomy 
over the sanctity of life. If autonomy can be given primacy over sanctity 
of life (at least for particular categories of persons), can it be given 
primacy in other areas? That depends on whether autonomy is given 
primacy because it is an essential aspect of liberty, which is now valued 
above all or many other goods – “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to 
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and 
of the mystery of human life”.86 Is it because what is right or wrong 
depends on each individual’s subjective definition? The repercussions 
on the conception of autonomy in areas such as the definition of 
marriage and family life cannot be ignored. 
                                                          
82 Eduard Verhagen & Pieter JJ Sauer, “The Groningen Protocol – Euthanasia in 
Severely Ill Newborns” (2005) 352 N Engl J Med 959. 
83 Herbert Hendin, “The Practice of Euthanasia” (2003) 33(4) Hastings Center Report 44. 
84 John B Mitchell, “My Father, John Locke and Assisted Suicide: The Real 
Constitutional Right” (2006) 3 Ind Health L Rev 45 at 96. 
85 See paras 5–23. 
86 Planned Parenthood v Casey 505 US 833 at 851 (1992). 
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35 The second main principle at stake relates to the moral worth of 
persons similarly placed relative to those who are permitted to choose 
euthanasia: are their lives devalued? Allowing the terminally ill, for 
example, to choose euthanasia seems to mean that while the State 
generally upholds sanctity of life for others, the principle may be 
derogated from in such cases: the State supports their desire for suicide. 
While, on one hand, it seems to recognise the magnitude of suffering on 
their part, on the other, it arguably signals that their lives may not be 
worth living, such that there is no longer any state interest in curtailing 
their choices to end their lives. The principle that such lives are not 
worth living, while at first constrained in its application by the 
autonomous choice of such persons, would be a new principle adopted 
by the State that may have wider repercussions in future on the worth of 
similarly placed persons. Such devaluation attacks the principle of equal 
moral worth and dignity that is essential to the proper functioning of an 
egalitarian society that respects all persons. How would Toh and Yeo 
have dealt with such an argument? The devaluation of such lives 
through legalisation can also be seen as destructive of a fundamental 
agreement as to good and evil that Devlin regarded as rightfully to be 
protected by the law. 
36 In fact, Toh and Yeo valued the coherence of principles on 
which laws pivot, because they distinguished PAS and VAE, arguing that 
legalising PAS does not mean that VAE must be legalised, and further 
arguing that having allowed advance medical directives (“AMDs”), we 
must allow PAS. Both arguments may be rebutted. 
37 In relation to the distinction between PAS and VAE, it might be 
argued that there is no significant moral difference between PAS and 
VAE where ethical issues relating to medical professionals are 
concerned. The possibility of abuse is not negated by requiring the 
patient to carry out the final act, though some argue, based on common 
sense, notwithstanding Stanley Milgram’s experiments that suggest the 
likelihood of people following the directives of authority, that people are 
less likely to be pressured into killing themselves than letting someone 
else kill them.87 But it might be argued that once PAS is available, on 
principle, those too weak or unable to carry out PAS because of their 
medical condition should not be denied VAE. Moreover, even patients 
who can carry out PAS might prefer a professional to carry out the act 
for them.88 
                                                          
87 John Deigh, “Physician-assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia: Some Relevant 
Differences” (1998) 88 J Crim Law & Criminology 1155. 
88 Nicholas Dixon, “On the Difference between Physician-assisted Suicide and Active 
Euthanasia” (1998) 28(5) Hastings Center Report 25. 
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38 In contrast, the fact that AMDs are permissible does not entail 
that PAS should be legalised. Toh and Yeo’s rejection of the distinction 
between AMDs and PAS on the grounds that both quicken death and 
because the classification of the withdrawal or withholding of life-
sustaining treatment is “suspect”89 is incorrect. 
39 Even without the AMDA, a person can choose to reject medical 
treatment. The common law’s approach to the right to refuse treatment 
is borne out of respect for a person’s autonomy, with forced medication 
being seen as a battery,90 but this does not mean that it endorses a right 
to suicide. In the case of rejection of medical treatment, if death results, 
it is caused by the untreated medical condition, and not by a separate 
act. Some have argued that as it is impermissible for a physician to let an 
injured patient bleed to death even though death results from a natural 
process, the significant factor is not the omission involved in passive 
euthanasia: an omission can be designed to caused death. They have 
argued that from the perspective of a patient wishing to die, there is “no 
morally pertinent difference between a doctor’s terminating treatment 
that keeps him alive, if that is what he wishes, and a doctor’s helping him 
to end his own life by providing lethal pills he may take himself, when 
ready, if that is what he wishes – except that the latter may be quicker 
and more humane”.91 The analogy of passive euthanasia with the 
physician allowing a patient (who wishes to live) to bleed to death is, 
however, misconceived. In both cases, physicians have duties to treat the 
patient; in the passive euthanasia case only, such a duty no longer 
subsists by the rejection of the treatment. Moreover, the characterisation 
of passive euthanasia and PAS as being the same from the perspective of 
the patient glosses over the fact that the patient who requests the 
withdrawal of extraordinary life-sustaining measures may simply be 
rejecting the invasive measures, without necessarily actually wanting to 
die. There are instances when extraordinary life-sustaining measures 
have been removed from patients but patients continued to live, 
showing the difference between removing life support and causing 
death.92 A right to be let alone in refusal of medical treatment does not 
entail a right to a drug that hastens or causes death. The AMDA merely 
adds to the common law position in the scenario when a person is no 
                                                          
89 Toh Puay San & Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-assisted Suicide in 
Singapore” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 379 at 386–387. 
90 Washington v Glucksberg 521 US 702 at 725 (1997). 
91 Ronald Dworkin, Peter L Zimroth & Abe Krash, “The Philosopher’s Brief”  
(10 December 1996) <https://cyber.harvard.edu/bridge/Philosophy/philbrf.htm> 
(accessed 18 January 2017) at Part II. 
92 This argument has been made in relation to Karen Quinlan’s case, when Quinlan 
continued to live for another ten years after her respirator was removed: see 
Wesley J Smith, “Does Human Life Have Intrinsic Value Merely Because It Is 
Human?” (2006) 13 Trinity L Rev 45 at 88. 
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longer in the position to express their wishes. In such a case, one may 
indicate through an AMD that a range of extraordinary life-sustaining 
treatment is to be withheld or withdrawn, so that the difficult decision is 
not left to one’s relatives, who might also dispute with one another. 
IV. Subordinate concerns relating to the medical profession 
40 The concerns relating to the medical profession are subordinate 
or subsidiary as the decisive arguments for whether euthanasia should 
be legalised really pertain to the issue of whether the law should 
facilitate an individual’s desire to end their life. These concerns are 
considered as Toh and Yeo discussed the violation of the Hippocratic 
Oath if physicians were to be involved in PAS, and proposed a modified 
version of the oath. As the violation of the oath is hardly the main 
objection in relation to the involvement of the medical profession, the 
modification of the oath also fails to provide the answer to the objection. 
The real objection must be a more substantive one: the oath is regarded 
as important only inasmuch as it captures the quintessential role of 
physicians. 
41 The fact that there is aversion to physicians being directly or 
indirectly involved in euthanasia is evident in various ways. Rationally 
or not, PAS is viewed as more acceptable than VAE as physicians do not 
have to perform the final act that causes death. Oregon’s Death with 
Dignity Act93 allows PAS through the prescription of oral medicines but 
not through the provision of drugs for a lethal injection: this may reflect 
an aversion to physicians performing acts such as the setting up of 
intravenous lines for the lethal injection.94 The further removed 
physicians are, the better. 
42 There are several reasons for the aversion. The trust between 
patients and physicians might be broken if the requirement that 
physicians act in the best interest of patients could be satisfied by the 
proposal of euthanasia. Patients might fear seeing physicians if 
euthanasia might be proposed as the solution to their illness.95 Given the 
dynamic of inequality between the physician and the patient, an already 
dejected patient facing a bleak prognosis could be overwhelmed by 
                                                          
93 Chapter 127, 127.880 s 3.14. 
94 Contrast Glen R McMurry, “An Unconstitutional Death: The Oregon Death with 
Dignity Act’s Prohibition against Self-administered Lethal Injection” (2005) 
32 U Dayton L Rev 441 at 458, which argued that the integrity of the medical 
profession is not affected as the final act is still done by the patient. 
95 Ken Levy, “Gonzales v Oregon and Physician-assisted Suicide: Ethical and Policy 
Issues” (2007) 42 Tulsa L Rev 699 at 726–727. 
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suggestions from their physicians,96 rendering their true consent 
suspect. The integrity97 of the profession would be compromised if 
physicians, traditionally seen as healers, can offer death as an option, 
instead of doing their best to cure the illness; though some argue that 
euthanasia can count as an alleviation of suffering and, hence, 
physicians who propose it are still seen as serving a legitimate medical 
purpose.98 Medical practice might change if physicians came additionally 
to assess patients in terms of their falling within the category described 
by laws permitting euthanasia: physicians might develop a tendency to 
regard patients as being in unbearable suffering or as having given up.99 
As it is, clinicians, in spite of the illegality of euthanasia, already 
intentionally overdose patients.100 The long-term effects on the ecology 
of medical practice, when the profession is already under pressure to 
manage scarce healthcare resources in light of an aging population, 
cannot be ignored. 
43 There is also concern that the legal availability of euthanasia 
would lend to a failure to invest in palliative medicine. This results in a 
vicious cycle as a lack of palliative care in turn causes some physicians to 
propose euthanasia when faced with suffering patients. Conversely, with 
greater availability of better palliative care, some physicians have been 
found to become more restrictive in their practice of euthanasia.101 
44 In relation to palliative care, Toh and Yeo, rejecting the doctrine 
of double effect, also insisted that the legal act of physicians 
administering painkillers which have the side effect of hastening death 
is not very different from the step they propose. Doing such acts with 
such side effects are “tantamount to intention in the criminal law”.102 
While the doctrine of double effect is contentious in ethics, those 
difficulties do not seriously attend to the case of administering 
painkillers as part of palliative care. First, as a matter of practice, 
physicians involved in palliative care do consider the magnitude of the 
risks or weigh the pros and cons of certain medicines and carefully 
                                                          
96 Susan R Martyn & Henry J Bourguignon, “Physician-assisted Suicide: The Lethal 
Flaws of the Ninth and Second Circuit Decisions” (1997) 85 Cal L Rev 371 at 395. 
97 Washington v Glucksberg 521 US 702 at 731 (1997), per Rehnquist CJ. 
98 Ken Levy, “Gonzales v Oregon and Physician-assisted Suicide: Ethical and Policy 
Issues” (2007) 42 Tulsa L Rev 699 at 700. 
99 Henk A M J ten Have & Jos V M Welie, “Euthanasia: Normal Medical Practice” 
(1992) 22(2) Hastings Center Report 34. 
100 David A Asch & Michael L DeKay, “Euthanasia Among US Critical Care Nurses: 
Practices, Attitudes, and Social and Professional Correlates” (1997) 35 Medical 
Care 890 at 898. 
101 Susan R Martyn & Henry J Bourguignon, “Physician-assisted Suicide: The Lethal 
Flaws of the Ninth and Second Circuit Decisions” (1997) 85 Cal L Rev 371 at 413. 
102 Toh Puay San & Stanley Yeo, “Decriminalising Physician-assisted Suicide in 
Singapore” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 379 at 388. 
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calibrate the dosage. Second, when physicians, on the pretext of 
palliative care, administer potentially lethal analgesics103 in dosages that 
hasten or lead to death, these cases are regarded as abuses in a regime 
that disallows euthanasia or as cases in which medical personnel 
proceeded without consent in a regime that allows VAE. Thus, the fact 
that physicians administer potentially lethal doses of painkillers in 
palliative care is not directly relevant to the case for legalisation. 
V. Conclusion 
45 A scene at a coin-operated tram for young children at a mall is 
etched in this author’s mind: a toddler struggled to get out of the tram 
after a ride, while his father lovingly put a protective hand over his  
head to prevent any knocks. There was something unmistakably and 
disconcertingly familiar about the unsteady gait of the toddler and his 
dependence on others as he attempted to step out of the tram. They 
were starkly similar to those of an elderly person who might be suffering 
from osteoporosis, spinal degeneration and other effects of aging. Some 
such elderly persons are blessed enough to have others lovingly 
watching out for them (and their heads) as they struggle out of cars. 
Others might be treated less patiently. Yet others might have been 
dumped by family members who now find them to be a burden. 
46 Nothing captures more vividly our callous attitudes towards 
those at the end-stage of their lives than the contrast between how some 
of us sometimes treat lovingly and with patience dependent toddlers 
who embody the promise of new life and better days, and how we treat 
the dependent elderly, some of whose physical and mental conditions 
seem to be on a course of irreversible deterioration and increasing 
helplessness. In the case of the former, we can envision the length of the 
journey of dependence and we might anticipate reaping relational and 
other benefits thereafter; in the case of the latter, we do not know how 
short or long the journey is, and some of us might find it hard to walk 
faithfully with another person through suffering. 
47 As Finnis incisively observed when rebutting Ronald Dworkin’s 
view of “one’s life as a narrative of which one is the author, so that when 
one ceases to be in command of the plot, one’s remaining life – 
denounced as mere biological life – is valueless”:104 
                                                          
103 Kenneth I Vaux, “The Theological Ethics of Euthanasia” (1989) 19(1) Hastings 
Center Report 19. 
104 John Finnis, “Euthanasia and Justice” in Human Rights and Common Good: 
Collected Essays: Volume III (Oxford University Press, 2011) at pp 266 and 267. 
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It is indeed hard for people like judges, professors, classical scholars, 
and so forth – used to mastery, achievement, and control – to accept 
the prospect of becoming or being subject to great deprivation and 
more or less complete dependence. They – we – are understandably 
misguidedly tempted to view such a state as spoiling their ‘narrative’. 
The view is radically mistaken: the narrative of which they can (where 
they rightly can) be proud is a narrative which ends when their actual 
ability to carry out choices ends. Beyond that point, as (in one’s earliest 
years) before it, there is life which is real, human, and personal, but 
without a story of which to be proud or ashamed. An utterly common 
human condition. 
48 It is an ironic mischaracterisation of opposition to PAS and VAE 
to view such opposition as stemming from an attitude dismissive or 
disrespectful of human dignity. Surely, it is those who refuse to accept 
that a human being has not in any way lost their dignity at the end of 
their lives even when they are helpless who insist on such persons being 
given the choice of PAS and/or VAE. In contrast, opponents of PAS and 
VAE are accepting of the different phases in the life cycle of a human 
being. While young children and people in their end-stage share some 
similarities in their dependence on others, a person in their end-stage of 
life is less likely to have loved ones pinning their hopes on the person in 
the same way that people are prone (rightly or wrongly) to pin their 
hopes on children. But opponents of PAS and VAE are precisely 
cognisant that the dignity – the moral worth – of those at the end-stage 
of life is not any less just because such persons might be worth less to 
others or because such persons are no longer useful to society. To the 
pragmatic, the elderly may be a burden, when there is really nothing 
wrong with being a burden to others.105 Their – indeed, our – moral 
worth and dignity are intrinsic, not derivative. 
49 Many at the end-stage of life need far more support and love to 
find the strength to live. Losing the will to live, as might be the case for 
many, should hardly be conflated with highfalutin ideas of exercise of 
autonomy and of one’s right to define the “sweet-mystery-of-life”.106 
Choosing not to fail those at the end-stage of life – choosing to arise in 
support of them – is not to be equated with prolonging life at all costs. 
The AMDA already rejects the view that life must be prolonged at all 
costs. Denying euthanasia honours the sanctity of life and the equal, 
underived, intrinsic moral worth of all persons, including the very 
                                                          
105 This is how it was put by two commentators: see Stanley Hauerwas & Richard 
Bondi, “Memory, Community and the Reasons for Living: Theological and Ethical 
Reflections on Suicide and Euthanasia” (1976) 44 Journal of the American Academy 
of Religion 439 at 451. 
106 This was how Scalia J, dissenting in Lawrence v Texas 539 US 558 (2003), referred 
to Kennedy J’s famous passage referring to an individual’s right to define their own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. 
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weakest who can no longer contribute to society – principles on which 
so many other laws pivot. 
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